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R  E  V  I  S  T  A   D  E   E  S  T  U  D  I  O  S   I  N  T  E  R  N  A  C  I  O  N  A  L  E  S
The growing trend to consider as customary law rules devised to support
preferences and arguments, that cannot otherwise qualify as law, is leading to
serious doubts about the real meaning of international law. This article exa-
mines the reasons behind this phenomenon and reflects on means for
strengthening the traditional requirements of customary international law so
as to ensure that proper law is made.  It notes that customary international law
cannot depend on the advancement of instrumental goals some times in
contradiction with the requirements of a stable legal system. The articles exa-
mines in particular the meaning of States’ practice and opinio juris,  the
traditional elements for the formation of customary rules. It argues in conclusion
that the efforts at reengineering customary law have actually revived its role
to an unexpected extent, to the point that the reaction against its manipulation
is gradually bringing back international law to its normal balance.
CUSTOMIZING YOUR OWN NEEDS
mong the many incisive remarks
made by Sir Robert Jennings, there
is one that stands up for its accu-
racy and reflection of current realities:
“[m]ost of what we perversely persist in
calling customary law is not only not cus-
tomary law; it does not even faintly re-
semble a customary law”1.  Yet, every
passing day more and more purported
rules are labelled customary law if this
helps to support an argument that cannot
otherwise be sustained under the law.
What is most disquieting about this phe-
nomenon is not that authors and govern-
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ments tend to rely on such an approach,
but that judges and practitioners have
embarked in such an exercise too, prompt-
ing doubts about the very basis of interna-
tional law.
Idealism needs to find a rule of law
even where there is none.
Bad as this situation tends to be with
respect to general issues of international
law, it turns only worse in certain fields
where idealism, and occasionally political
interest, needs to find a rule of law even
where there is none, or reach an interpre-
tation of a rule that does not even remotely
allow for such a development. A desired
outcome is then substituted for the strict
rule of law.
Fidler has put together an impressive
account of authors who have warned
about, or explained, this trend2.  With re-
spect to human rights, Simma and Alston,
for -example, have noted an “identity crisis
in customary law” because of the search
for customary law wherever is needed3;
Henkin has remarked that most of human
rights law cannot be identified with cus-
tomary law since it does not derive from
State practice or consent4; and Sohn has
also explained that States not even make
the law on human rights as it emerges from
people, scholars and law journals5.  The situ-
ation is not very different in connection with
international environmental law6  or, more
recently, as a tool for justifying the use of
force in international affairs7.
Why is this process gaining ground and
how should the traditional requirements of
customary international law be strength-
ened in order to ensure that proper law is
made, are the main concerns that will be
discussed in this contribution.
A first aspect that must be noted is
that which an author has described as the
“evaporation of law from international
law”8.  The concerns relating to the exag-
2 Fidler, supra note 1, at 224-226.
3 Bruno Simma and Philip Alston: “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and
General Principles”, Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 12, 1992, at 88, 107, and discus-
sion and citation by Fidler, supra note 1, at 225.
4 Louis Henkin: “Human Rights and State ‘Sovereignty’”, Georgia Journal of International and Com-
parative Law, Vol. 25, 1995, 31, at 38, and discussion and citation by Fidler, supra note 1, at 225.
5 Louis B. Sohn: “Sources of International Law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law, Vol. 25, 1995, 339, at 399, and discussion and citation by Fidler, supra note 1, at 225.
6 Daniel M. Bodansky: “Customary (and not so Customary) International Environmental Law”,
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 3, 1995, 105, and discussion and citation by Fidler,
supra note 1, at 199-200, 224-225.
7 The doctrine of Just War and that of preventive self-defense, for example, have been invoked as
justifying both the Gulf War in 1991 and that concerning Iraq in 2003. On the international law
implications of these events see Vaughan Lowe: “The Iraq Crisis: What Now?”, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 52, 2003, 859-871; and Gilbert Guillaume: “Terrorism and Interna-
tional Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2004, 537-548.
8 Outi Korhonen: “Liberalism and International Law: A Centre Projecting a Periphery”, Nordic Jour-
nal of International Law, Vol. 65, 1996, 481-532, at 481-484.
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gerated use of “soft law”, package deal-
ing, bargaining, settlement-type outcomes
and other that author identifies, are not
alien to this particular development9.  Cus-
tomary international law could not escape
from a frame where regimes matter more
than the law, international relations side-
up with advocacy and at the very end
what matters is to accomplish instrumen-
tal goals rather than count on a stable le-
gal framework10.
The politics underlying the different
approaches to the sources of international
law have also been well explained by
Koskenniemi11.  The increasing criticism
of consensualism to justify the departure
from State consent to ascertain the exist-
ence of a rule, explained by some con-
cept of social necessity or by the resort to
some form of tacit or presumed consent,
even if wholly artificial, means that non-
consensualism becomes the desired out-
come12.  Again, customary law cannot es-
cape from a setting where consent and
State practice are not considered relevant
for the determination of the legal norm,
particularly when the identification of a
rule of customary law is always sur-
rounded by some degree of difficulty.
Customary law cannot escape from a
setting where consent and State
practice are not considered relevant
for determining the legal norm.
A NOT SO MYSTERIOUS MYSTERY
It is quite true that customary interna-
tional law is surrounded by mystery13.  It
has even been remarked that the drafters
of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice and its predecessor did not have
a clear idea about what custom was14.
One such mystery is, of course, how
can a rule of law develop on more than one
occasion from the violation of a pre-exist-
ing rule of law15. In turn, the perception of
what is the law on that particular matter
9 Korhonen, supra note 8, at 482.
1 0 Korhonen, supra note 8, at 484-485, with particular reference to Slaughter: “Liberal International
Relations Theory and International Economic Law”, American University Journal of International
Law and Policy, explaining that the international legal system is “seeking to accomplish instrumental
goals”, Vol. 10, 1995, 717, at 729.
1 1 See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 1, and by the same author: The Gentle Civilizer of Nations.
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960, 2001.
1 2 Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 21-22.
1 3 Prosper Weil: “Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité”, Cours Général de Droit International
Public, Académie de Droit International, Vol. 237, 1992-VI, 161-164, and George Abi-Saab: “La
coutume dans tous ses états, ou: Le dilemme du droit international général dans un monde éclaté”, Le
Droit International á l’heure de sa codification, Etudes en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, 1987, Vol. 1, 55,
at 58 et seq.
1 4 Karol Wolfke: Custom in Present International Law, 1993, 5-6, and discussion and citation by Fidler,
supra note 1, at 200.
1 5 Weil, supra note 13, at 162.
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might not be entirely shared. Indeed, the
enactment of a 200-mile area of maritime
jurisdiction, for example, was perceived by
some as a violation of a rule on a restricted
territorial sea and contiguous zone, but not
by others who believed that resource-re-
lated jurisdiction was previously unknown
under international law and hence there was
no specific rule governing the matter in a
way not dissimilar to what had happened
with respect to continental shelf jurisdic-
tion16.  The end result, however, is that one
way or the other the new rule became ac-
cepted and proclaimed as customary inter-
national law, thus superseding whatever
there was or there was not earlier.
MICROWAVING CUSTOMARY LAW
A second area of mystery surround-
ing customary law is that concerning the
basis of its binding character. Barberis has
rightly pointed out that the traditional ex-
planation of the Grundnorm as the ulti-
mate source of such binding obligation is
in itself a contradiction17.  Indeed, to jus-
tify the binding nature of custom on the
existence of another customary rule that
so says is a rather circular argument. Yet,
the very foundation of international law in
Kelsen’s theory of law is related to the
ultimate existence of pacta sunt servanda
as a rule of customary law18.
The various theories that have been
advanced to explain the nature of custom-
ary law reflect  mostly  a self-interested
doctrinal approach that purports to justify
a given view of the process, rather than
to seek a real scientific answer to this dif-
ficult subject. The theory of pactum
tacitum, while reflecting the need for
State consent to be bound by a rule of
customary law, takes this safeguard of sov-
ereignty to the length that there would be
no binding rule if such consent is not estab-
lished directly or indirectly19;  it will seen
that this is not actually the reality of cus-
tomary law because that binding effect is
in some aspects independent from the
process of consent and admits exceptions
thereto, albeit limited and legally precise.
In some aspects, the binding effect of
a rule of customary law is independent
from the process of consent.
Still less convincing is Ago’s theory
of customary law as “spontaneous law”20,
1 6 Francisco Orrego Vicuña: The Exclusive Economic Zone. Regime and Legal Nature under Interna-
tional Law, 1989, at 3-15.
1 7 Julio A. Barberis: “Reflexions sur la coutume internationale”, Annuaire Français de Droit Interna-
tional, Vol. XXXVI, 1990, 9-46, at 15-17.
1 8 Hans Kelsen: General Theory of Law and State, 1945, at 110 et seq. and discussion by Barberis,
supra note 17, at 14-15.
1 9 Rudolf Bernhardt: “Customary International Law: New and Old Problems”, Thesaurus Acroasium,
Vol. XIX, 1992, 202-221, at 208; Maurice Mendelson: “The Subjective Element in Customary
International Law”, The British Year Book of International Law 1995, 1996, 177-208, at 178.
2 0 Roberto Ago: “Diritto positivo e diritto internazionale”, Scritti di Diritto internazionale in onore di
Tomaso Perassi, 1957, Vol. 1, 1, at 44, and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 179.
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and hence different from the elaborate
nature of treaty law, as it has been rightly
pointed out that customary law is far from
spontaneous and relies on a careful cal-
culation by States through the process21.
Neither does Bin Cheng’s view of an “in-
stant” customary law help to explain the
nature of custom, but does of course have
a connection with the discussion about the
interrelationship between treaties and cus-
tom that will be examined below22.
Customary law seldom needs
consensus to come into being.
Consensus has been another favoured
theory (Suy, en Bern. P. 208, n. 6)23,  but
this approach neither reflects the reality
of how customary law is formed and ap-
plied. Seldom does customary law need
consensus to come into being, although
consensus might be achieved at a later
point in the process, particularly in the
context of a codification conference.
The role of natural law in explaining
customary law does not lack interest24,  but
this relates either to historical elements in-
fluencing the formation of the international
legal system or to the identification of rules
that are fundamental for the international
community, as opposed to ordinary rules.
This in turn is the basis for the distinction
between rules of constitutional international
law and other rules that do not have such
importance25.  The significance of interna-
tional constitutional law is gaining in impor-
tance as the global society evolves into a
more structured community, and many such
fundamental principles may be indeed em-
bodied in customary law26.
In this respect is should be noted that
the International Court of Justice has not
followed a consistent approach in dealing
with customary law. During the period of
the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice and the early years of the present
Court, consent or acceptance played an
important role regarding the identification
of customary rules.  Thus, in the Lotus
case emphasis was placed on the free will
of States expressing principles of law
though generally accepted conventions or
usages27.  In  Asylum there was a ques-
2 1 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 179.
2 2 Bin Cheng: “United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Customary Law?”,
Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, 1965, at 23, and discussion by Bernhardt, supra note 19,
at 215. On the discussion about instant customary law and the role of treaties see Maurice H.
Mendelson: “The Formation of Customary International Law”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de
Droit International, Vol. 272, 1999, 368-382.
2 3 Eric Suy: “Rôle et signification du consensus dans l’élaboration du droit international”, Le Droit
International á l’heure de sa codification, Etudes en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, 1987, Vol. 1, at 521.
2 4 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 208.
2 5 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 210; Abi Saab, supra note 13, at 64; Weil, supra note 13, at 193-194.
2 6 Christian Tomuschat: “Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will”, Recueil des
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, Vol. 241, 1993-IV, at 292-309; Francisco Orrego Vicuña:
International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving Global Society: Constitutionalization, Accesibility,
Privatization, 2004.
2 7 The SS Lotus, PCIJ, Series A, No. 10, 1927, 4, at 18, and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 181.
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tion of lack of proof of a given practice
having been accepted28,  while in Fisher-
ies the absence of protest was also influ-
ential in the outcome29.  Acceptance also
appears to have inspired the Right of
Passage30  and general opinion appears
to underlie Wimbledon31.
The ICJ has not followed a
consistent approach in dealing
with customary law.
In more recent times, however, it
would seem that far from adhering to a
given theory the Court has found a cus-
tomary rule whenever and wherever it has
deemed it necessary or convenient to iden-
tify such a rule or to go beyond treaty
rules. It has been noted that in Notte-
bohm32  and Barcelona Traction general
rules seemed to have been enough, inde-
pendently from acceptance33.  More gen-
erally, opinio juris has been at the heart
of many decisions, including the North Sea
Continental Shelf, the Libya- Malta, and
Nicaragua34,  not understood as an indi-
cation of consent but in a rather loose
manner that heavily departs from the
practice of States. This last decision will
be discussed further below.
This state of flux in the theory and
practice concerning customary law lends
itself to many possible interpretations.
However, some of these interpretations will
be made within the framework of law and
its reasonable evolution and change and
some other will be outside such bounds.
The need to draw the line between one
and the other then becomes essential for
the stability of the legal system.
CONVENIENTLY PRACTICAL PRACTICE
It is an accepted element of custom-
ary law that it must be based on practice.
But how much practice, how long, and
how consistent it needs to be is a matter
open to discussion. That is quite a legiti-
mate discussion, but the problem is that it
has ranged from those requiring just a
handful of States to develop a practice
serving as the basis for a customary rule,
to those that require overarching majori-
ties to this effect.
2 8 Asylum Case, ICJ Reports, 1950, 266, at 276-278, and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 181.
2 9 Fisheries Case, ICJ Reports, 1951, 116, at 136-139, and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19, at
181-182.
3 0 Right of Passage Case, ICJ Reports, 1960, 6, at 39-40, and discussion by Mendelson, supra note 19,
at 182.
3 1 The SS Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, 15, at 26-28, and discussion by Mendelson, supra
note 19, at 182.
3 2 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 182, with reference to the Nottebohm Case, ICJ Reports, 1955, 4, at 12-26.
3 3 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 182, with reference to the Barcelona Traction (Second Phase) Case,
ICJ Reports, 1970, 3.
3 4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at 44; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta)
Case, ICJ Reports, 1985, 13, at 29-30; Nicaragua (Merits) Case, ICJ Reports, 1986, 14, at 97-101;
and discussion of these cases by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 182-183.
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It is beyond doubt that the participa-
tion of particularly interested States will
be an essential requirement of the prac-
tice considered, as it has been rightly iden-
tified by the International Court of Jus-
tice35.  The practice of these  States will
greatly influence the formation of a cus-
tomary rule, but of course normally it will
not be enough, as the participation of a
relevant number of States will be required
if that practice airns to reflect some de-
gree of universality. How many is the rel-
evant number is again open to discussion
in the light of the specific matter con-
cerned, but it cannot be as small as to re-
sult in a practice that is either unilateral,
or the outcome of a very limited group of
States, unless it is a case of particular or
regional customary law. The sense of com-
mon direction in the international commu-
nity is again the relevant factor, more than
numbers themselves.
The number of States adhering to a
certain practice will influence the
information of a customary rule.
On the other hand, for some authors
the discussion becomes a question of ma-
jorities versus minorities36.  While the prac-
tice of States representing broad eco-
nomic, political and legal systems might
be desirable, it is by no means a require-
ment of the process. In this connection,
the practice of fewer States might be rel-
evant if it meets the conditions of density,
significance and sense of direction noted
above, even if a number of other States
have either not participated formally or
even might be interested in establishing a
practice to the contrary. This was the situ-
ation underlying the dispute about new
States being bound by rules of customary
law in the formation of which they had
not participated37.  Although this particu-
lar dispute is no longer active, as it re-
sponded to a given moment of unsettled
legal principles at the time of deco-
lonization, it evidences the underlying dan-
gers of uncertainty in the state of custom-
ary law.
It must also be noted that on occa-
sions it is just the practice of one State
that triggers the development of a proc-
ess that will end up in the formation of a
customary rule. This was the case, for
example, of the United States in connec-
tion with continental shelf jurisdiction and
of Chile in connection with the 200-mile
maritime jurisdiction. How many States
need to be added is a question not of ma-
jority but of sufficient strength as to make
the practice viable in legal terms. In the
case of the continental shelf, overwhelm-
ing support was achieved in a span of only
few years. In that of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, the process gained strength
3 5 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at 43, and discussion by Weil, supra note
13, at 166-167. See also generally Maurice H. Mendelson: “The Formation of Customary Interna-
tional Law”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, Vol. 272, 1999, 155-410.
3 6 Dissident Opinion of M. Lachs in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, 3, at
227, as commented by Weil supra note 13, at 167.
3 7 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 218-219.
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as a gathering storm, beginning with a few
States in South America and extending to
numbers in other continents; it could be
ascertained that the practice had turned
into customary law much earlier than a
majority could be counted in, and in spite
of the contrary practice and legal belief
still maintained by a handful of other sig-
nificant States, which in turn evolved
gradually into the acceptance of the new
practice or rule.
On occasions, the practice of one State
triggers a process that leads to the
formation of a customary rule.
Neither is there a need that practice
be identical in every detail and expres-
sion38,  yet it is necessary that there is a
sense of common direction between par-
ticipating States and entities. This is what
Weil refers to as a practice sufficiently
dense39.  The fact that a State conduct to
the contrary might be eventually present
does not mean either that the conditions
for the formation of a customary rule are
not met40.
Moreover, time might be a relative fac-
tor if it is evident that during the relevant
period that practice has gathered sufficient
strength. While custom concerning the laws
of war took centuries to materialize that
concerning the continental shelf took as
noted just a few years. Historical accel-
eration is making the process faster, but in
any event the essence of the question is
that practice be real and meaningful.
ALL ABOARD
What is considered to be State prac-
tice is another issue related to this discus-
sion. All types of evidence are occasion-
ally taken into account, including treaties,
legislation, resolutions of international or-
ganizations and many other diplomatic
acts. Yet only some of these can be con-
sidered hard evidence, other are just a sort
of soft evidence and still some are not
evidence at all as there is no intention to
follow such practice in any persistent man-
ner. Resolutions of international organiza-
tions and conferences are some times rid-
dled with this kind of problem, as will be
discussed below. On the other hand, as
noted by Barberis, it is not excluded that
customary law may be based on the nega-
tive practice of States or their abstention,
as opposed to positive or affirmative prac-
tice, thus compounding the range of choices
as to what practice might be considered
relevant in a given situation41.
Even if a practice does not gather suf-
ficient strength so as to become universally
binding international law or give birth to a
general rule of law, it might still qualify as
custom binding on a group of States or even
on two States or give place to a particular
3 8 Nicaragua (Merits) Case, ICJ Reports, 1986, 14, at 97-101, and discussion by Weil, supra note 13,
at 165.
3 9 Weil, supra note 13, at 164-168.
4 0 Barberis, supra note 17, at 25.
4 1 Barberis, supra note 17, at 22.
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rule42.  However, this is also a question of
how far the process has evolved at a given
time. As rightly commented by Elias and
Lim, the practice of Latin American States
concerning asylum could well be a prac-
tice influencing the formation of a general
rule of customary law but when examined
by the International Court of Justice had
not yet gathered momentum to that effect43.
Moreover, although many States might
not recognize a practice as developing into
a given legal concept they might at the
same time recognize other types of prac-
tice inspired in the same values. This is
what happened specifically in respect of
diplomatic asylum, not recognized many
times beyond Latin America, but where
many of those States not so recognizing
accept and engage in practice giving pro-
tection to the same humanitarian values,
albeit labelled differently. The end effect
of the practice is then the same.
The mystery surrounding customary
law can be solved within the
framework of legal reasoning.
However great the mystery surround-
ing customary international law might be
it is still possible to solve it within the
framework of legal reasoning. The prob-
lem becomes a serious one when the rea-
soning lies beyond that framework and
pursues objectives other than the correct
identification of a rule of law. That is no
longer a legal exercise associated to the
work of sources of international law.
A NON-OPINIONATED OPINIO JURIS
If practice is difficult enough to assess,
the second element governing the forma-
tion of a rule of customary international law,
namely opinio juris, has become still more
unassailable. This is not the result of a par-
ticular legal difficulty, as it is quite evident
that not any expression of practice can lead
to the formation of a legal rule but this proc-
ess requires the conviction that such a prac-
tice must be observed as a legal right or
obligation in the belief that it is indeed an
established legal rule. The difficulty found
today is rather one associated with the in-
terplay of the two basic elements.
A number of authors have been right
in pointing out the contradiction that opinio
juris entails as if this element is a require-
ment for the formation of a rule of law it
is not quite easy to reconcile it with the
need to believe that it is already a binding
rule of law44.  As explained by Kelsen in
an early work, it is not possible to believe
in the existence of a legal rule embodied
in practice that in reality does not exist
because opinio juris has not yet produced
its effects45.  But this apparent contradic-
4 2 Asylum, supra note 28; Right of Passage, supra note 30.
4 3 O. A. Elias and C. L. Lim: The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law, 1998, at 120.
4 4 Barberis, supra note 17, at 27-28; Anthony A. D’Amato: The Concept of Custom in International
Law, 1971, at 66, and discussion by Fidler, supra note 1, at 204-205.
4 5 Barberis, supra note 17, at 27, with reference to Kelsen: “Théorie du droit international coutumier”,
Revue Internationale, 1939, at 263-264.
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tion can be explained in terms that cus-
tomary law involves a process of interac-
tion along time, during which practice
gradually acquires a legal effect that
opinio juris recognizes and at some point
consolidates into a new legal rule.
There has been scepticism as to the
actual need of opinio juris for the
formation of a rule of customary law.
The evidence required to establish that
the psychological element characterizing
opinio juris is present or has been com-
pleted is indeed difficult if not quite im-
possible to attain. It is on this basis that
many authors have been sceptical about
the need for this element46  or in any event
for the need to prove it47.  However, as
aptly discussed by Barberis, there are in
fact two types of practice that intervene
in the formation of customary law48.  The
first is conforming to a practice believed
positive by the community, while the sec-
ond is that such a community can also re-
act adversely to a practice that does not
conform to their sense of legal commit-
ment. Both types taken together do indeed
provide a clear answer as to when and
how opinio juris has intervened and per-
formed its function in the formation of the
customary rule. True as it is that it is diffi-
cult to know what States believe49,  there
is nonetheless a sense of legal attachment
that allows to understand when a practice
is devoid of legal effects and when it is
the basis of a legal rule50.
What cannot be explained is the view
that as opinio juris is the expression of
recognition of a pre-existing legal element
embodied in practice, it suffices with prac-
tice for the formation of the rule and the
role of opinio juris becomes unnecessary.
The consequence of this approach is dou-
bly negative. First, it allows to consider
that just any practice can give rise to a
new rule of law without a further filtering
of its legal effects. Next, and worse, it al-
lows to pick and choose what practice will
be taken into account to reach a legal con-
clusion51,  even if such a practice does not
really reflect the consent of States or other
subjects to engage in it with any legal con-
viction.
The practical result of this negative
outcome is that treaties are occasionally
taken to reflect customary law not only
when they have been amply ratified and
are fully in force but also when they have
remained unratified or are still in the proc-
ess of negotiation52.  As many kinds of
4 6 For a discussion of doctrinal developments in this respect, see Barberis, supra note 17, at 28-30.
4 7 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 204-206.
4 8 Barberis, supra note 17, at 30.
4 9 M. Virally: “The Sources of International Law”, in M. Sorensen (ed.): Manual of Public International
Law, 1968, 116, at 133-134, and Anthony A. D’Amato, supra note 44, at 35-39, both as discussed
by Mendelson, supra note 19, at 195-196.
5 0 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 197.
5 1 Fidler, supra note 1, at 202.
5 2 Weil, supra note 13, at 175.
Costumary International Law in a Global Community: Tailor Made?
31
State acts can indeed constitute practice,
there is the added danger that any such
practice might be taken to reflect custom-
ary law. Would this be the meaning of the
acts of any State organ, including internal
organs, or would it still be necessary to
identify an extended and broadly accepted
practice confirmed by the intervention of
opinio juris?
The difficulty is of course com-
pounded when also the acts of interna-
tional organizations are taken into account
as the expression of practice transformed
into customary law53. There can be no
doubt that the practice developed under
international organizations can lead to the
formation of a customary rule, but this is
only when the participating States have
had the specific intention of assigning to
such a practice a legal effect, that is when
opinio juris has intervened.
Professor Bernhardt has rightly ex-
plained that while there are no insurmount-
able dogmatic difficulties hindering the
recognition of resolutions as elements in
the formation of customary international
law, a careful approach is necessary. To
this effect the “context of the resolution,
the surrounding circumstances, the number
of positive votes, the absence of opposi-
tion and additional factors must be con-
sidered”, including whether “the actual
State practice outside the organization is
in conformity with the resolution or at least
does not exhibit a quite different picture”54.
Even more caution is recommended in
respect of the resolutions passed by inter-
national conferences55.
This again is not just a question of
majorities but of the intention surrounding
the expression of that majority. There is
indeed a number of situations in which the
evident intent of the participating States
and the majority vote is not to undertake a
legal commitment by means of the adop-
tion of resolutions, as happens with most
of the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly. To extrapo-
late this phenomenon into customary law,
and even include therein abstentions, will
distort the process of genuine formation
of a customary rule to the extreme56.
To proclain the existence of a
customary rule where there
is none leads to confusion.
This is a position that not only States
occasionally adopt in pursuance of given
interests, however transitory they might
be, but in which occasionally international
and domestic courts and tribunals become
themselves involved57.  To proclaim the
5 3 Nicaragua case, supra note 38, at 100-103; The Rainbow Warrior case (cite), pars. 76 et seq., both
as discussed by Weil, supra note 13, at 175-176.
5 4 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 216.
5 5 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 216.
5 6 Weil, supra note 13, at 175-177.
5 7 Weil, supra note 13, at 176-177, with particular reference to the Burkina Faso/Mali case, ICJ
Reports, 1986, par. 565 et seq. and the extension of the doctrine of uti possidetis to the African
continent even in the absence of practice and opinio juris.
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existence of a customary rule when there
is none, or where practice is only remotely
connected to the formation of such rule,
is perhaps tempting so as to justify a deci-
sion in  a given dispute, but in legal terms
only greater confusion will ensue. The
heavy reliance of the International Court
of Justice on United Nations resolutions
in Nicaragua is yet again a manifestation
of this anomaly58  and as such it has been
the matter of heavy criticism59.
A related consequence is of course that
the stringent requirement of time in con-
nection to the relevance of the practice in
question will be significantly weakened60.
Historical acceleration requiring a less pro-
longed period of time is perfectly real, as
evidenced in the examples given above of
the continental shelf and exclusive eco-
nomic zone, but different is the omission of
the relevant time altogether. The concept
of instant or spontaneous custom noted
above is inserted into this last situation61,
as is the strong reaction that this approach
has generated62.  The famous expression
of René-Jean Dupuy on “coutume sage et
coutume sauvage” does indeed reflect the
terms of the problem with due justice63.
PACTA SUNT NON SERVANDA
Once the logical sequence of events
leading to the formation of a customary
rule is altered, several other anomalies are
to follow. One such contemporary
anomaly is the relationship between cus-
tom and treaties. For long it has been ac-
knowledged that treaties can embody and
give written expression to rules of cus-
tomary law either partially or in the
broader context of the codification of cus-
tomary rules64. In fact, the interrelation-
ship between treaties and custom has
been historically very strong, to the point
that the very binding force of treaties de-
pends on a rule of customary law, pacta
sunt servanda, which as noted above has
even been invoked as the ultimate justifi-
cation of the whole legal system, both in-
ternational and domestic65.
The interrelationship between
treaties and custom has been
historically very strong.
5 8 Nicaragua, supra note 38, and discussion of the case by J. Verhoeven: “Le droit, le juge et la violence.
Les arrêts Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis”, Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1987, 1204, at
1206-1208.
5 9 Anthony D’Amato: “Trashing Customary International Law”, American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 81, 1987, at 101-102; Jonathan Charney: “International Agreements and the Development
of Customary International Law”, Washington Law Review, Vol. 61, 1971, at 995; both as discussed
and cited by Fidler, supra note 1, at 206-207, 226.
6 0 Weil, supra note 13, at 177-178.
6 1 Supra notes 20, 22.
6 2 Weil, supra note 13, at 178-179 with discussion of critic literature.
6 3 René-Jean Dupuy: “Coutume sage et coutume sauvage”, La communauté internationale. Mélanges
offerts à Charles Rousseau, 1974, at 75 et seq., and discussion by Weil, supra note 13, at 178.
6 4 Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 257-259.
6 5 Kelsen, supra note 18.
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The problem lies, however, as noted
by Weil66,  in that expressions of jurispru-
dence67 and the writing of authors68  have
supported the conclusion that beyond codi-
fication or the recognition of existing rules
of customary law treaties can generate
customary rules by a combination of prac-
tice and opinio juris which is largely self-
contained in the treaty or else can crys-
tallize rules that are in the process of for-
mation. True as it is that the line separat-
ing a treaty rule from a customary rule is
often very fine, nonetheless one or the
other can only be identified as law when
the consent of States or other subjects has
been properly given or at the very least
the formative process has been completed.
It follows that if States have not ex-
pressed their consent to a customary rule
by means of practice and opinio juris it
cannot be held that such a rule exists as
custom, even if a later treaty could have
so proclaimed. The theory of the persist-
ent objector that will be examined below
rests in part on this premise. The view that
consent can be de-linked from obligations
arising at a later stage, particularly if ma-
jority interpretation intervenes, has not evi-
denced much support69.
The process of formation of customary
law cannot be governed by treaty, not even
by Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice70,  as it is only prac-
tice and opinio juris properly expressed that
can give birth to the customary rule. The
role of the treaty will be either to ascertain
that this process has indeed been completed
or else that the relevant practice is also em-
bodied in that particular treaty.
Not even Article 38 of the Statute of
the ICJ can govern the process of
formation customary law.
Precisely because consent is absent
from unratified treaties or from treaties un-
der negotiation is that these kinds of instru-
ments cannot be taken to crystallize a rule
of customary law, even less so to give birth
to a new one. Moreover, treaties not yet in
force pose a particular danger in that differ-
ent States will invoke different provisions or
their interpretation as customary law and no
institutions or dispute settlement procedures
will be available to settle the issue71. Again
here, as explained by Bernhardt, the treaty
rules will have to be scrutinized carefully in
the light of actual State practice so as to find
out what the law in force really is72.
6 6 Weil, supra note 13, at 180-183.
6 7 North Sea, supra note 34; Libya-Malta, supra note 34; Nicaragua, supra note 38; Tunisia Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, ICJ Reports, 1982, 18, at 23; and Gulf of Maine, ICJ Reports, 1984, 246, at 294;
all as discussed by Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 257-259.
6 8 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga: “International Law in the Past Third of a Century”, Cours Général,
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International, Vol. 159, 1978-I, at 14 et seq, and discussion
by Weil, supra note 13, at 180.
6 9 Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 261-262.
7 0 Barberis, supra note 17, at 37-38.
7 1 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 217-218.
7 2 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 218.
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In the light of this discussion it can only
be concluded that it was not appropriate
for the International Court of Justice to
heavily bring into play and rely on a rule
of customary law as an alternative to
treaty arrangements in the Nicaragua
case73.  Politically convenient this approach
might have been, but it reflects a profound
alteration of the reasonable legal interac-
tion between treaties and custom, so much
so that two sources that have traditionally
been considered hierarchical identical be-
come subordinate one to the other74.  One
thing is to accept the simultaneous valid-
ity of a customary rule and a treaty rule75
and quite a different thing is to have a
customary rule overriding a treaty ar-
rangement.
To accept the simultaneous validity of
a customary rule and a treaty rule
does not imply accepting that the
former can override the latter.
There is still another difficulty emerg-
ing from these alterations that must be
considered. Just as custom becomes
blurred in the light of treaty arrangements
that do not necessarily reflect a custom-
ary rule or does not so with the same
meaning and extent, also treaty rules suf-
fer from the same confusion as it will not
be clear what is properly conventional law
and what is customary law. The end re-
sult is that treaties loose the precision that
supposedly is their advantage over cus-
tomary law76.  Then the interpretation and
application of these various sources loose
their rigor and allow for all sort of inter-
ests to take charge of a process that was
until now governed by a scientific-legal
method.
This is even more delicate in the light
of the fact that the interpretation and ap-
plication of customary law and conven-
tional law do not follow the same meth-
ods and standards, as explained by the
International Court of Justice in the very
Nicaragua case77.  The very essence of
international law thus becomes uncertain
and subject to manipulation by different
interests78.
NON PERSISTENT OBJECTORS
Another consequence engendered by
the alteration of the elements of custom-
ary law relates to the situation of third
States in both the formation and the appli-
cation of a rule of customary law. As
mentioned further above, not all States are
required to participate in the formation of
a new rule by means of their practice and
opinio juris. However, once the rule is
7 3 Weil, supra note 13, at 180-181.
7 4 See the discussion of this relationship in Barberis, supra note 17, at 40.
7 5 K. Wolfke: “Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary International Law”, Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXIV, 1993, 1-16, at 10.
7 6 Weil, supra note 13, at 182-186.
7 7 Weil, supra note 13, at 185.
7 8 Weil, supra note 13, at 189.
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born it will normally be applicable to all
States, irrespective of their participation
or even of the fact whether they were in
existence at the time the process of for-
mation took place79.  Provided the proc-
ess is sufficiently representative of the
legal sense of the community, individual
participation is not a relevant factor for
the determination of the existence of the
rule. Customary rules thus become rules
of general application or part of general
international law.
Once the customary rule is
born, it will normally be applicable
to all States.
While the situation described might be
the most common or usual, there are a
number of important exceptions. There is
first the exception of rules which are not
general in character but involve a particu-
lar custom, such as rules of regional or
bilateral customary law, where the par-
ticipation of the States concerned and the
evidence thereof will of course be a more
stringent requirement for the proper for-
mation of the rule in question80. Although
it is debated whether consent and partici-
pation are different in respect of general
and particular customary law81, the fact of
the matter is that the more narrow the rule
is the more close the connection with con-
cerned States will need to be. The para-
mount requirement of consent in all re-
spects was of course embodied in the
Soviet theory of international law at the
time of bitter East-West confrontation82,
today not more than a historic reminis-
cence.
The second major exception is that
concerning the persistent objector and the
right to “opt-out” of an emerging custom-
ary rule. A State that has persistently op-
posed the formation of a rule of custom-
ary law since its inception will normally
be beyond the reach of such rule how-
ever general its nature may be83.  How-
ever, here again important alterations have
intervened. A process that was supposed
to be general in respect of the formation
of the rule is now being turned into a proc-
ess where the binding effects of the rule
are also supposed to be general, thereby
meaning that no exception could be ad-
7 9 Barberis, supra note 17, at 38-39.
8 0 For a discussion on the differences and similarities concerning general and particular customary law,
see generally Elias and Lim, supra note 43, at 121-127, with critical reference to D’Amato’s views
arguing for a stronger showing of consent where particular law is concerned,  at 125-126.
8 1 Elias and Lim, supra note 43, at 126-127, with particular reference to Thirlway’s views arguing that
there is no difference in this respect between general and particular law, at 126-127.
8 2 Grigory Tunkin: Theory of International Law, 1974, at 124, and discussion of the Soviet theory in
Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 283-284.
8 3 Barberis, supra note 17, at 38-39, with particular reference to Ted L. Stein: “The Approach of the
Different Drummer: the Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law”, Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal, 1985, at 457; Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 220; Tomuschat, supra note 26, at 284-




missible and thus leading to the predomi-
nance of the “plus puissants ou des plus
nombreux”84.
The narrower the rule, the
closer will need to be connection
with concerned States.
In spite that scholarly criticism of this
theory continues until this day85,  in prac-
tice things have been different from
theory. First, seldom has a State invoked
the concept of persistent objector to es-
cape the binding effect of a rule of cus-
tomary law; it suffices to argue that the
rule in question is not supported by suffi-
cient practice or opinio juris and when
things turn for the worse a State has nor-
mally rallied behind the new rule but pur-
porting to influence a meaning and extent
different from that which was originally
envisaged86.
 Dupuy has rightly commented that
“[e]n pratique, on a dû également constater
que l’objection persistante est une arme
que le temps, à lui seul, suffit à émousser,
lorsqu’elle se heurte à la position
déterminée de la majorité des Etats
existants”87.  The converse reality, how-
ever, is also true in that a persistent objec-
tion will many times be powerful enough
to determine a change in the rule as origi-
nally envisaged and lead to a process of
accommodation in which both the indi-
vidual and the majority interests will at-
tain a balance. This influence has not been
deprived of success as many rules of cus-
tomary law are today different from what
they were or could have been at their in-
ception and earlier State practice, as the
case of the Exclusive Economic Zone and
to some extent that of deep seabed min-
ing show88.
A second important difference be-
tween practice and theory concerns the
question of jus cogens. It has been rightly
held that no objection, however persist-
ent, can have any effect if it affects the
non derogation that characterizes a rule
of peremptory international law89. There
is of course a logical support for this view.
If a rule is not subject to derogation, dero-
gation cannot be permitted by the way of
an exception.
The real question, however, is differ-
ent. The rules of jus cogens that are fun-
damental to the international community
and can be thus compared to rules of a
constitutional hierarchy, have for long been
incorporated as rules of customary law90.
8 4 Weil, supra note 13, at 187-189, citation at 189.
8 5 Pierre-Marie Dupuy: “L’Unité de l’Ordre Juridique International”, Cours Général, Académie de
Droit International, Vol. 297, 2002, at 174-176.
8 6 Weil, supra note 13, at 191-193, with particular reference to the Asylum case, supra note 28, and the
Fisheries case, supra note 29.
8 7 Dupuy, supra note 85, at 176.
8 8 Orrego Vicuña, supra note 16, Chapter 8 on “The Exclusive Economic Zone in Customary Interna-
tional Law”.
8 9 Barberis, supra note 17, at 39.
9 0 Weil, supra note 13, at 200.
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Therefore, the question of a persistent
objection to such rules does not arise.
What happens is that there is a concerted
effort to identify as rules of jus cogens
propositions that have been hardly tested
as to their acceptability and that are thus
not peremptory or customary. But this is
part of a different debate.
Customary law has been subject to a
judicial and scholarly challenge of
unprecedented proportions.
A NEW AUTHORITARIANISM THROUGH
THE NON RULE OF LAW
The discussion examined reveals quite
powerfully that customary law has been
subject to a judicial and scholarly challenge
of unprecedented proportions, certainly
beyond what would be the normal evolu-
tion of international law in the light of the
changing international society to which it
applies. The reasons behind this challenge
correspond in part to very legitimate intel-
lectual concerns but also in part to con-
siderations that are related to the instru-
mental use of international law to attain
desired social and political ends. Weil has
explained this phenomenon in a straight-
forward manner:
“…la fonction stratégique de la cou-
tume se trouve radicalement modifiée...à
la coutume conservatrice et traditiona-
liste, fondée sur la stabilité et la conso-
lidation, a succédé la coutume innova-
trice et révolutionnaire, levier de chan-
gement de l’ordre international”91.
The issue at the heart of this contro-
versy is not different from that which has
surrounded international law generally and
the role of treaties in particular, that is the
struggle between “volontarisme” and
“objectivisme”, the first rooted in the con-
sent of sovereign States and the second
in the powers of occasional majorities and
other expressions92.
In fact, it is not difficult to realize that
the views supporting the liberalization of
practice, the diminished influence of
opinio juris or its disqualification, the role
of custom as a source of general rules of
international law, the non-recognition of
persistent objections or the redefined con-
nection with treaties, as opposed to those
that require the strict application of the
legal standards governing customary law
and its interplay with other sources of in-
ternational law, are all related to one or
other of those broad options separating
consent from majority rule.
Yet, it must be noted that it is appar-
ent that customary law has not been
equated in contemporary international law
with a purely voluntarist approach strictly
requiring consent in respect of the identi-
fication or application of all rules of cus-
tomary law. In particular, opinio juris has
not meant unanimity93. But neither does
9 1 Weil, supra note 13, at 178; see also Fidler, supra note 1, at 224-225.
9 2 Dupuy, supra note 85, at 162-164.
9 3 Mendelson, supra note 19, at 184-192.
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this mean that State participation can be
dispensed with or that occasional majori-
ties can substitute for the required degree
of support for practice and opinio juris
that will be in any event needed to give
rise to a new customary rule. As is many
times the case with international law, a
sense of balance is the one that finally
prevails.
The implications of the debate, how-
ever, are not merely theoretical. The trou-
blesome question is not so much the ex-
istence of different approaches to the role
of sources of international law, with par-
ticular reference to customary law, as it is
the underlying premise that the will of the
subjects of international law does not re-
ally matter. Only the view of those who
“know better” can be justified as law.
Koskenniemi concludes with a note of
warning that must be taken very seriously.
First, if rules of law are based on pure
political acceptability and not on legal cer-
tainty, nothing will prevent “their use as
apologies for tyranny”94.  And next:
“But even if it were possible to
“know better”, such an argument is not
really defensible within the premises of
the Rule of Law. It contains the unpleas-
ant implication that we could no longer
rely on the expressed will of the legal
subject. It would lose the principal jus-
tification behind democratic legislation
and justify the establishment of a Le-
viathan – the one who knows best what
everyone “really” wills. It is a strategy
9 4 Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 32.
9 5 Koskenniemi, supra note 1, at 22.
9 6 Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 203-204.
for introducing authoritarian opinions
in democratic disguise”95.
 The end result of this confrontation
is rather paradoxical. At one point it was
believed that customary law would be su-
perseded by treaty law as a consequence
of major codification conferences and that
the new law would of course express the
right approach to each subject. Codifica-
tion achieved this result only in part and
mostly in respect of technical, non-politi-
cal matters. It was soon discovered that
if customary law could be taken to mean
something different from what it had tra-
ditionally meant, this was a much easier
way to attain the desired goals.
The frantic process of reengineering
customary law was thus launched. As a
result, the role of customary law has re-
vived to an unexpected extent. As writ-
ten by Bernhardt it is “hardly correct” to
believe that customary law is no longer of
great importance.96  But to the extent that
the process has gone beyond reasonable-
ness and incurred in inevitable exaggera-
tion, and even threatened to get out of
control, the reaction of governments,
scholars and judges has prompted a re-
dress of the situation, which is thus gradu-
ally being brought back into the normal
balance of international law.
Customary law is here to stay and, as
has always been the case, it is a source of
international law that will only mean what
practice and opinio juris has intended it
to mean.
